• Focus on regional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, resulting in a unique tactical environment awareness and shaping opportunity that was briefed to the commander of the 7th Fleet and forwarded to the commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet. At the same time, we deployed members of the NIOC detachment across the force to provide training assist visits.
• Conduct underway EW assistance visits that assessed readiness with an afloat training group checklist and provided hands-on training to officers and operators.
• Provide generic area-limitation environment training to every BHR ARG EW module and embarked Radio Battalion Marine. This enhanced blue-green interoperability, improved joint cryptologic capabilities, and enabled every sensor to contribute to the 7th Fleet common operating picture.
• Train Joint Intelligence Center and EW module personnel to produce a specific electronic intelligence product routinely requested by intelligence personnel.
• Conduct computer-network defense assistance visits that trained information technology and network security personnel and provided each commanding officer with comprehensive recommendations for improvement. This significantly increased network security and enabled BHR ARG to counter cyber attacks and defend the ship against exercise and real-world threats.

In summary, COMPHIBRON 11 and the *Bonhomme Richard* ARG built a flat command structure, drove integration between ship operations and information-dominance tasking, and leveraged the embarked NIOC detachment's warfighting capabilities and expertise to train the ARG/MEU, increasing the fleet's warfighting capability across all platforms.

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Understanding Security Cooperation

By Michael McCrabb

Today's Navy must address a growing range of security threats in concert with our maritime partners. By design, we have an extraordinary maritime tool set to help shape those partnerships and enable global networks. The key is to ensure that Navy staffs know what tools are available and can then determine how best to use them to develop the most effective partnerships and networks. This is a work in progress.

U.S. Navy officers and sailors prepare for the tenet of "warfighting first" throughout their careers, operating forward, ready to respond as necessary. Today, however, the value of operating with and fighting alongside our maritime partners is greater than ever, as highlighted in the concept of a "global network of navies."[1] We have equipped allies with Aegis ship platforms, SM-3 missiles, EA-18G Growlers, P-8s, MH-60Rs, and a variety of other modern U.S. Navy hardware, and we continue to open new opportunities to train and exercise with partners in more realistic scenarios. Expanding information and technology transfer agreements, cooperative deployments, new fleet synthetic training capabilities, and fresh academic and tactical relationships are emerging.

Fleet partnership stations continue to grow new maritime-security capabilities, open doors with humanitarian-assistance efforts, and expand international maritime domain awareness networks to cover an ever increasing percentage of the global commons. Such activities, among others, fall under the label of security cooperation, which is defined as:

> All [DOD] interactions with foreign establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.[2]

The size of the current U.S. Navy security-cooperation effort is immense, and the list of players is considerable. The Navy's 2013 Campaign Support Plan, which accounts for scheduled Navy security-cooperation events, was over 460 pages long. The 2014 version is over 550 pages. Navy personnel involved in executing security cooperation activities are spread across the force: regional staffs, including naval component commands and numbered fleet staffs, commands involved in foreign military sales (FMS) and other security assistance programs, OPNAV staff, the foreign-area officer community scattered worldwide, learning centers and professional military education institutions, commands and staffs in the continental United States conducting various engagement events, and other commands identified as security cooperation enabling commands. Finally, there are the deployed operational and Reserve units conducting theater security cooperation activities worldwide, in addition to fulfilling their primary role as ready warfighters in waiting.

Building Partnership Value

Today's challenge is to blend all Navy security-cooperation events—theater engagement activities, security-assistance activities (including FMS equipment and training activities), senior officer dialogues, personnel exchanges, information-sharing forums, and other initiatives—into a unified effort for shaping partnerships. For most partner nations, there are hundreds of Navy security-cooperation events

per country per year conducted worldwide, and no single Navy staff is manned or trained to put a full country or regional picture together. Regional Navy component command staffs have cognizance of theater-security cooperation events. OPNAV staff coordinates headquarters engagement activities while the Navy International Programs Office and systems commands manage FMS and related activities. The Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War College educate hundreds of international defense students annually, while Navy learning centers train thousands more. The Offices of Naval Research and Naval Intelligence have partnership initiatives as well. Bringing unity to these efforts is no easy task.

Consider some of the aspects affecting Navy security cooperation event coordination. For example:

- Security cooperation is just one part of the Defense Department's country plans, and an even smaller part of the overall U.S. government strategy per country.
- Many security-assistance activities, as a subset of security cooperation, focus on developing good governance: civilian control of defense sectors, transparency, good resource management practices, anti-corruption measures, Rule of Law, and internationally recognized standards of human rights. One might be surprised to see such events included among Navy efforts, but they can be powerful tools for preventing conflict.
- There is keen competition for access and influence. Many of our partner nations are recipients of security cooperation initiatives from other countries as well, some without democratically based strings attached.

The 2013 Maritime Security Cooperation Policy (MSCP) identifies a well-defined planning cycle for executing theater activities. Conducting accurate assessments to determine partner-nation defense shortfalls and identifying attainable capacity-building measures are important first steps in the planning cycle. But sustainability matters. Staff planners must ascertain whether a partner nation has the resources and willingness to maintain new defense capabilities.

Valid post-event assessments are critical as well, and they are required.[3] Congressional attention to DOD security-assistance activities in which U.S. tax dollars are invested can be an opportunity to highlight successes. Too often they have had the opposite impact.[4]

Some events may not be in regional staffs' normal "scan pattern." Knowing where a partner nation's U.S. Naval War College or Joint Forces Staff College graduates are assigned might be useful to a regional staff planner. That information is available if one knows where to look.

U.S. NAVY

U.S. and Brazilian naval officers meet at the Brazilian Naval War College in March as part of preparations for UNITAS 2015. "Today's challenge is to blend all Navy security-cooperation events . . . into a unified effort for shaping partnerships," the author acknowledges.

Likewise, planners should be cognizant of information-sharing agreements early in a staff tour.

Having a long view is important. Knowing what a partner's defense capabilities were ten years ago and where they want to be ten years henceforth gives one a critical perspective in setting up tomorrow's security cooperation event lineup.

History reveals that the value of humanitarian-assistance/disaster-response missions can be extraordinary in terms of gaining access/influence, especially if naval efforts are well coordinated with the overall U.S. government effort.[5]

Security-cooperation activities, especially when exercising warfighting skills, can be severely restricted by information-disclosure limitations. FMS initiatives, cross-deck opportunities, cooperative deployment events, and officer-exchange programs are also impacted. A new staff planner may not recognize when a U.S.-partner nation relationship has outgrown its current disclosure limits. For example, a country adding air-defense capability through U.S. FMS acquisition may be operating under outdated disclosure limits, restricting interoperability. Staff planners need to understand what assets are available to help initiate disclosure adjustments and open new opportunities for exercises and warfighting.

Knowledge Gaps and Solutions

An emerging maritime security cooperation framework is intended to produce this increased value from the mass of security cooperation activity. Current framework development efforts, however, indicate a limited understanding among staffs of the full scope. For example:

The MSCP only addresses theater security-cooperation activities, bypassing the entire scope of FMS and other security-assistance programs. To achieve "an integrated maritime approach to [security cooperation] in order to support national security objectives," as it proposes, the policy must incorporate security assistance programs and activities.

The Navy must grow security cooperation expertise quickly. We are the only service without a security-cooperation planner's course, and few planners ar-

rive at their staff assignments with an adequate understanding of security cooperation. Too often, planning considerations are learned on the job. There are resources to help avoid this: The U.S. Marine Corps has an excellent security-cooperation planner's course; the Naval Warfare Development Command has a guide; and Derek Reveron, of the Naval War College staff, wrote *Exporting Security*, one of the first books to highlight security cooperation.

Regional component command staffs do the majority of theater security-cooperation planning, but execution is spread across a variety of maritime commands. A maturing maritime-security cooperation approach is best achieved collectively among the maritime services. An annual forum to address event coordination, planning, execution, training, lessons learned, and innovation is particularly important as part of framework development.

The Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System is an emerging source of security cooperation data. This new resource will help plan and assess events through situational awareness of past, present, and future events. But it will take time, effort, and creativity for planners and policy makers to determine how the system can best be used.

Until we put organizational mechanisms in place to coordinate all Navy security-cooperation efforts, our efforts to shape maritime partnerships and enable global networks will be suboptimized. Additionally, there are still prominent government voices warning of negative consequences from using U.S. forces in activities other than warfighting. Our national leadership, however, continues to embrace security cooperation as a primary mission of the U.S. armed forces.[6] A well thought-out defense-security cooperation policy—one that develops strong defense partnerships and effective coalition warfighting skills to support diplomatic and development efforts—can prevent conflict and help achieve national objectives of global security and stability. The maritime component of that policy is evolving and it will take considerable thought, innovation, foresight, and coordination among the security cooperation community to reach its potential for growing partnerships.

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Counter-narcotics Tactics in the Western Hemisphere

By Captain Edward Westfall, Commander Patrick Peschka, and Lieutenant Joseph DiRenzo IV, U.S. Coast Guard

There are few greater shared experiences for a Coast Guard crew than to successfully interdict a go-fast vessel suspected of smuggling narcotics. It is a culmination of training and coordination among different elements of the crew and, often, several external stakeholders. These interdictions do not happen by chance and often involve multiple Coast Guard and Navy vessels, helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft working together in an organized manner, supported by dedicated intelligence. It underscores the very essence of the term "unity of effort."

A drug smuggling interdiction may be likened to a choreographed dance or a well prepared meal. Each asset must perform a certain task at a precise moment in time to successfully apprehend the smugglers, vessel, and contraband. An increased number of such coordinated interdictions are envisioned in the Coast Guard's Western Hemisphere strategy, which calls for a greater Coast Guard presence in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific to combat transnational organized crime. This strategy includes not only service-specific assets and capabilities but also the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, government agencies and departments, and international partner nations.

The Coast Guard has established itself as the premier maritime law-enforcement agency, and its personnel have become the nation's experts in counter-narcotics operations in known drug transit zones in the Eastern Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea. For the last several decades, cutters have taken a single unit approach to preparing for and executing the counter-drug mission. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) have been developed for single cutter operations. Little guidance is published on how Coast Guard cutters (and attached small boats and helicopters) should integrate with other Coast Guard cutters and DHS, DOD, and partner-nation assets. Tactical decision makers generally learn and practice tactics through osmosis based on observations from previous tours. Instead, counter-drug tactics should be taught in a more systematic manner. Training should be mandatory for all decision makers who will be involved in combating transnational criminal organizations to provide commonality when preparing for and executing the counter-drug mission.

The Meaning of "Tactics"

When discussing the importance of teaching and practicing "tactics," it is